In the context of modern sampling methods for redistricting, we define the clustering of a political party (or of a geographic region), and we study how clustering affects the expected election outcome.
Introduction
The mathematical literature on redistricting and detecting gerrymandering has recently begun to coalesce around sampling methods. The basic idea is to generate an ensemble of thousands or millions of randomly generated redistricting plans, and the underlying fairness principle is that an enacted plan should not be an outlier. In particular, one political party's seat-share should not differ by too many standard deviations from its average seat-share among the ensemble.
Sampling methods have been applied (and have formed the basis of legal briefs) for Wisconsin [6] , North Carolina [5, 7] , Pennsylvania [4] and other states. The political geography of most of these states (which means the manner in which Democrat and Republican voters are spatially distributed across the state, as snapshotted by the vote tallies from a particular race) results in a structural advantage for Republicans. The sampling methods allow this structural advantage to be separated from the advantage caused by an allegedly biased map.
This structural advantage is typically attributed to the way that Democrat voters are packed into dense cities while Republican voters are more evenly distributed across rural areas (see for example [2] ), but this is a bit vague and speculative. The sampling methods themselves do not illuminate the reason for structural bias. Other possible causes include the spacial distribution of non-voters and the state's redistricting criteria, including its operationalization of the Voter's Rights Act. In fact, the claim that "Democrats are disadvantaged because they are packed into cities" is much older than the modern sampling methods that are required to precisely formulate the claim.
Is a political party disadvantaged (with respect to its seat-share averaged over an ensemble) by being more clustered? Or by being concentrated in geographical areas that are themselves more clustered? The purpose of this paper is to propose a definition of "clustering" that allows such questions to be precisely formulated and studied in the context of sampling methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a general setup for modelling a state with two political parties under the simplifying assumption that everyone votes. In Section 3, we define the clustering of a political party. Intuitively, this measurement is lowest when the party's voters are distributed homogeneously across the state, and is highest when they are all segregated into one geographically isolated region of the state. We prove bounds on a party's average seat-share in terms of its clustering. With very low clustering, these bounds imply that the majority party is almost guaranteed to win all the seats. With very high clustering, these bounds guarantee an outcome close to proportionality.
In Section 4, we define the clustering of a geographical region, and we study the effect of clustering on the average seat-share when the political parties have different concentrations inside and outside the region. This simple model allows us to isolate and study the "blue city/red country" phenomenon. We conclude that concentration in a geographical region can be either advantageous or disadvantageous for a political party, depending on the details and the alternative to which it's being compared. Finally, the appendix contains a very general inequality for random variables upon which the main results in the paper are based.
set up
It is common to use a graph G to model a state that must be divided into k districts. The vertices of G represent the smallest units of population out of which districts are to be formed (for example, voter tabulation districts, precincts or wards). Let VERT denote the set of vertices of G. Two vertices are connected by an edge if the corresponding pair of geographical regions share a boundary with non-zero perimeter.
The vertices are weighted by a population function p; more precisely, if v ∈ VERT, then p(v) ∈ (0, 1) represents the fraction of the state's population that resides in v. We assume that everyone votes for either party A or party B, so the population of each vertex v ∈ VERT splits up correspondingly as:
The functions {p, p A , p B } on VERT can be applied to any subset C ⊂ VERT in the obvious additive way; for example, p(C) = v∈C p(v), and similarly for p A and p B .
A district means a subset D ⊂ VERT such that p(D) = 1/k. 1 A map means a partition of VERT into k districts.
Our starting point is a distribution on the space of maps. We'll denote the corresponding random variable as Γ. In this paper, we allow Γ to be arbitrary, but in practice one would have Pr(Γ = M ) = 0 for any map M that violate any of the state-specific redistricting rules like district contiguity, district compactness, and compliance with the Voters Rights Act. For example, Γ might be uniform among compliant maps, or might be weighted against barely-compliant maps. We refer to [7, page 7] for an overview of the varying methods that have been used to create ensembles of maps, including constructive randomized algorithms, optimization algorithms, and MCMC algorithms. In principle, any ensemble-generation method induces a distribution on the space of maps, but the MCMC approach matches best with the viewpoint of this paper because it generates an ensemble that can theoretically be proven to be a random sample from the space of all possible maps with respect to an explicitly described distribution.
Note that Γ induces a distribution on the space of districts. We'll denote the corresponding random variable asΓ. It is defined such that for any district D,
where the sum is over all maps M that contain D as one of their districts. Sampling fromΓ, which can be regarded as "choosing a random district," is the following two-step process: first choose a random map, then choose a random one of its k districts.
The Clustering of a political party
In this section, we propose a natural way to measure the clustering of the members of party A. This measurement will be close to zero in the homogeneous situation where p A (v)/p(v) has nearly the same value for all v ∈ VERT. At the other extreme, the measurement will be close to 1 when party A voters are all segregated into one geographically isolated region.
For this, first consider the vote-share random variable, V, defined such that for each district D,
which is just the fraction of the district that is loyal to party A. Notice that V is a random variable with respect toΓ. Denote µ V = E(V) and
This conclusion is very natural. For example, if 35% of the state's population is loyal to party A, the lemma says that on average 35% of a random district is loyal to party A. Although our setup allows Γ to be an arbitrary distribution on the space of maps, the following proof takes advantage of the fact thatΓ is not an arbitrary distribution on the space of districts, but rather has special properties just because it is induced by Γ.
Proof.
The partisan clustering is:
According to the appendix, K V ∈ (0, 1) measures the variance of V relative to the maximal variance possible for the given value of µ V . Values for K V close to zero occur when all vertices (and hence all districts) have about the same fraction of party A voters. On the other hand, values of K V close to 1 occur when a randomly chosen district is very likely to either be filled entirely with party A voters or contain no party A voters. Intuitively, we expect this to happen when the party A voters are geographically segregated on one side of the state, and the size of a district is small relative to the size of their turf.
We defined partisan clustering with respect to Party A, but it is straightforward to verify that the measurement would be unchanged if defined with respect to Party B; that is, the clustering of Party A equals the clustering of Party B.
Notice that K V depends not only on the graph G but also on the distribution Γ. The advantage of this dependence is that K V can be easily related to the expectation for the outcome of an election.
For any fixed map M , let S(M ) denote the seat-share of party A, which is defined as 1 k times the number of districts D of M in which p A (D) > p B (D). Notice that S is a random variable with respect to Γ. Let µ S denote its expected value.
Combining Lemma 3.3 with the θ = 1/2 case of Corollary 5.2 from the Appendix yields: Figure 2 ]. In particular,
In Figure 1 , the black lines represent Equation 3.1, the red curves represent part (1) of Proposition 3.4 applied to both parties, while the blue curves represent part (2) . The grey shaded regions represent the "feasible" points (µ V , µ S ) for the given values of K V , where "feasible" means consistent with all of the inequalities under consideration.
For small values of K V , the blue (Tchebysheff) curves dominate the story and ensure that a party with a reasonably large majority can expect to win almost all of the seats. In fact, in the limit as K V → 0, the area of the grey region in Figure 1 shrinks to zero and its shape converges to the "majority takes all" curve shown green in the left graph of the figure.
For large values of K V , the red curves dominate the story and guarantee an outcome close to proportionality. In fact, in the limit as K S → 1, the area of the grey region in Figure 1 shrinks to zero and its shape converges to the proportionality line µ S = µ V shown green in the right graph of the figure. In summary, a majority party will favor low clustering (winning all the seats), while a minority party will favor high clustering (achieving proportionality). But that's not the whole story. The next section shows that a minority party can hope for better than proportionality if their opponents are packed into a geographical region like a city.
The clustering of a city
In the previous section, we defined the clustering of a political party. In this section, we similarly define the clustering of a geographical region, and we analyze a simple model in which one party is more highly concentrated in such a region.
Let C ⊂ VERT be nonempty. We will refer to C as the city, although we allow it to be an arbitrary subset, and we will refer to its complement, VERT − C = {v ∈ VERT | v / ∈ C}, as the country. Consider the "city" random variable, C, defined such that for each district D,
which is just the fraction of the population of the district that lies in the city. Notice that C is a random variable with respect toΓ. Denote µ C = E(C) and σ 2 C = Var(C). Lemma 4.1. µ C = p(C).
We omit the proof of this lemma because it is similar Lemma 3.1.
Values for K C close to zero occur when C is something like a random sample of VERT. On the other hand, values of K C close to 1 occur when a randomly chosen district is very likely to be either entirely inside or entirely outside C; that is, when there is only a small probably of partial overlap.
Intuitively, we expect this to happen when the city is geographically isolated on one side of the state and the size of a district is small relative to the size of the city.
It is straightforward to verify that the clustering of C equals the clustering of VERT − C; that is; the clustering of the city equals the clustering of the country.
In the remainder of this section, we present a simple model that assumes that the city the country are individually homogeneous, with the city's concentration x of party A voters larger than the country's concentration y. 
The hypothesis y < 1 2 < x represents the only non-obvious case (after possibly swapping the roles of parties A and B), since x, y being on the same side of 1 2 would make µ S equal 0 or 1. Proof. Notice that V = x · C + y · (1 − C). In particular, (2) is obtained from the θ = 1 2 case of Proposition 5.1(2) as follows:
But part (1) can NOT be proven with an analogous computation; rather, it is proven using Proposition 5.1(1) with θ = 
Solving the system {µ
Making these substitutions completes the proof of part (1). Proposition 4.3 provides a lower bound on Party A's expected seat-share. If one exchange the roles of A and B throughout this paper, then the proposition instead give a lower bound on Party B's expected seat-share, which is equivalent to an upper bound on Party A's expected seat-share. Thus, after applying the proposition to both parties, one obtain lower and upper bounds on µ S .
The hypothesis that 0 < y < 1 2 < x < 1, which is really four inequalities, gets converted by Equation 4.2 into:
It is natural to consider {µ C , δ} as fixed constants, and define a, b in terms of them via by Equation 4.3.
Example 4.4. Suppose that µ C = .3 (that is, 30% of the population lives in the city) and δ = .4 (that is, Party A's concentration is 40% higher in the city than in the country). These values yielded a = .22 and b = .62, so the only interesting situation is when Party A's statewide vote share is µ V ∈ (.22, .62), which is the domain of the graphs in Figure 2 ; outside of this range, a single party holds a majority in both the city and the country, so µ S = 0 or µ S = 1. For smaller values of K C , the blue (Tchebysheff) curves dominate, and the story reduces to results from the previous section; in fact, the equations of the blue curves really just depend on the amount of partisan clustering, and not on anything specific to the city/country model.
For larger values of K C , only the red curves are relevant to the story. Figure 2 indicates something that is easily verified by Proposition 4.3(1); namely, as K C → 1, the area of the grey region approaches zero, while its shape approaches a horizontal line at height µ C (shown green in the right graph of the figure) . In Example 4.4, µ C = .3, so when the city is highly clustered, party A's expected seat-share is forced to be close to 30%, provided its statewide vote-share is between a = 22% and b = 62%. When this vote-share is close to b = 62%, this represents a very poor outcome for party A; in fact, it's close to the worst-case outcome that's explored in the following example. 
where "≈" means "arbitrarily close to." Equation 3.1 says that this is a lower bound on the seat-share with respect to any map, so it's interesting that it can be approximately attained as a lower bound on the average seatshare (averaged over all maps); thus, all maps are poor for party A.
In conclusion, it would be an oversimplification to categorically claim that a political party is disadvantaged by being concentrated in a city. In fact, "the city" and "the country" play symmetric roles in the model, and each party is concentrated in one of these regions. The truth is that concentration in a highly clustered region causes a party's expected seat-share to be close to the size of the region. This can be advantageous or disadvantageous depending on the alternative to which it's being compared. Compared to a political geography with low partisan clustering (which roughly yields a majority-takes-all outcome), it's advantageous for the minority party but not the majority party. Compared to a political geography with high partisan clustering (which roughly yields proportionality), Example 4.4 demonstrated that it can be advantageous or not, depending on whether the choice of µ V ∈ (.22, .62) is larger or smaller than µ C = .3.
APPENDIX: General Variance Bounds
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that X is a random variable with support in [0, 1], and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Denoting µ = E(X) and σ 2 = Var(X), we have:
Furthermore:
(
The Bhatia-Davis inequality from [1] says more generally for a random variable with support in [m, M ] that σ 2 ≤ (µ − m)(M − µ). Part (2) of Proposition 5.1 is a straightforward application of Tchebysheff's Inequality. Part (1) is related to the Bhatia-Davis inequality as follows: if σ 2 > µ(θ −µ), then the Bhatia-Davis inequality implies that X could not have support in [0, θ], and indeed this is exactly the cutoff after which part (1) concludes that Pr(X > θ) > 0.
Proof of part (1) of Proposition 5.1. Define
We wish to prove that F ≤ 0. First observe that if the support of X is in {0, θ, 1}, then the probability function for X has the form of Table 5 , where a = Pr(X = 1) = Pr (X > θ). In this case, writing σ in terms of a and then solving for a yields: a = µ 2 −θµ+σ 2 1−θ , which means F = 0. So to prove that F ≤ 0, we must demonstrate that this is the extreme case that maximizes F .
Assume for now that X is represented by a finite data set {a 1 , ..., a n } ⊂ [0, 1] with µ = 1 n a i and σ 2 = 1 n (µ − a i ) 2 . Notice that ∂µ ∂a 1 = 1 n . Assume that a 1 / ∈ {0, θ, 1}. The following computation is similar to the first proof of [1] :
There are three cases to consider. If a 1 ∈ 0, θ 2 , then moving a 1 left towards 0 increases F . If a 1 ∈ θ 2 , θ , then moving a 1 right towards θ increases F . If a 1 ∈ (θ, 1), then moving a 1 right towards 1 increases F . From this, it follows that F is maximized when the support of X is {0, θ, 1}, as desired.
The general result is obtained by approximating X as represented by a finite data set {a 1 , ..., a n } and taking the limit as n → ∞.
According to the Bhatia-Davis inequality, the value K = σ 2 µ(1−µ) ∈ (0, 1) measures the size of the variance relative to the maximal variance possible for the given value of µ. Proposition 5.1 can be easily rephrased in terms of K (rather than σ) as follows:
x Pr(X = x) 0 1 − a − 1 θ (µ − a) θ 1 θ (µ − a) 1 a Table 1 . The extreme case: the support of F is in {0, θ, 1}.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose that X is a random variable with support in [0, 1], and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Denote µ = E(X) and σ 2 = Var(X). Assume µ / ∈ {0, 1} and define K = σ 2 µ(1−µ) ∈ (0, 1). Then
